Analysis of London conference on Somalia

This particular conference was symbolically successful from the beginning in many aspects. It was the largest so far by attendance, not only by powerful states but also Muslim states like United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Turkey[1], which will help in the positive reception of the outcome by the Somali people as “open, and fair” unlike previous ones dominated by either Ethiopia, Kenya and the Western states, perceived negatively as occupation of Somalia. Additionally, it is the only conference attended by the leaders of Somaliland, a self declared de facto independent state[2]. Having leaders of Somaliland participate and agreeing to the call is positive since long lasting peace needs as much regional approach as it can get. Furthermore, through this conference thrust Somalia onto world stage, unlike previous conferences where it was conducted along the corridors of East African states.

Plausible outcome of the conference in regards to international security is recognising that the problem of piracy cannot only be tackled on the high seas but also on land, attacking its root causes. This is a very important part of the communiqué since attacking pirates and capturing them in the sea is a limited form of deterrence, functional economy, institutions like judiciary and correctional centres are needed to try them and address legal and justice issues. It is important to note that piracy is an outcome of state failure, poor economy, and absence of functional institutions, thus, solution to piracy does not lie with naval force alone but also within inland Somalia[3].

This conference adopted military approach in trying to solve piracy in the Horn of African state, although it has been long established that security challenges is as a result of state failure, political crisis and stalemate. Welcoming work of private armed security companies[4] in dealing with piracy is questionable, since the UK, USA and Kenyan Naval forces are in the international waters near Somali coast, thus question arises on who is responsible for actions of these firms if they go beyond their mandate. Furthermore, past experiences, has shown that military/use of force has failed in bringing stability to Somalia, the United States’ humanitarian intervention and the current AU mission, Ethiopian and Kenyan forces presence has actually increased radicalism, rather that foster state stability.

Optimistic as it may seem, some of the outcomes is quite idealistic. For example, it is unrealistic of the conference to not only promise to establish an assembly constitutive of all Somalia, a country highly divided, but expecting to do so in six months is too idealistic[5]. This is because, Somalia is a country whose infrastructure was destroyed by over 20 years of war, with no strong institution, and faces armed terrorists who will do anything to seize power from internationally supported government. It is quite interesting to see how the conference expects Somalia to implement, establish and organise a political event in six months considering the fact that even a stable well established democracy needs more time in conducting its elections country wide.

Implementation of Transition Federal Charter will impose federal system in Somalia. Devolution of power might be attractive in trying to prevent accumulation of power in Mogadishu, but the success of federalism in Somalia is questionable. This is a country that is highly divided; full of grievances, mistrust, and federalism will be nothing but institutionalisation of clannism and its strengthening which will ultimately plunge the country further into chaos.

Furthermore, prolonged protracted war has led to emergence of self-declared independent Somaliland, autonomous Puntland, and Galmudug. The status of these regions within Somalia and the way they perceive themselves to be, either independent of Somalia or otherwise is important in bringing stability to Somalia and the greater region of the Horn of Africa. The conference did not clearly highlight the role of these factions within Somalia, instead it called for “support for dialogue between Somaliland and the TFG[6]”, this appears to be ambiguous and problematic, as the relationship is not well defined since leaders of TFG sees Somaliland as a regional government while the latter sees Somalia as a neighbouring state. With no clear role of these regions in the building of Somali state, future is left to warring leaders to decide.

The conference offered important opportunities for political, businessmen and Diaspora Somalis to come together for Somali cause, which are humanitarian, security and governance issues. It also recognised importance of involving Somali people unlike previous conferences, it acted as a wheel that will drives the process, with Somalis taking first initiative.

Finally, the communiqué signed did not lay out any strategy for AMISOM forces departure from Somalia in the coming future. Moreover, there was no planned venture to have AMISOM forces alongside other forces from “Muslim” states[7], a hybrid of forces that will refute Al-Shabbab’s claim that AMISOM is an extension of Ethiopian and Ugandan forces occupying the land of Somali people, and argument they use to legitimise their cause and recruit fighters.

CONCLUSION

The conference was important in many ways, only time can tell if it can live up to its ambitious expectations. Additionally it has avoided failures of previous conferences so far by reaching out to Somali leaders, have a fixed date for ending the mandate of the TFG, and creation of Transitional Federal Charter, as well as tackling piracy by using land and sea strategies. However, there are shortcomings that needs to be addressed and successes of this conference will be presented at another conference in Istanbul June 2012, and an additional one on international maritime counter piracy is to be held in late June, 27-06 2012. Finally, Al-shabaab and pirates did not lead to collapse of state, clannism did, if Somaliland and Puntland have built strong and functioning entities that is unique to Somalia, so can Mogadishu based government. The future to stability is to have effective institutions that are based on Somali model used by the autonomous entities and strengthen them, instead of use of private military complex or AMISOM for that matter.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, (23 February 2012). London Conference on Somalia Communique. Lancaster House. URL: http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?id=727627582&view=PressS

Dr. Mohammed Al-Amin, (23/03/2012). The London Conference on Somalia:

Opportunities of Reconstruction & Indications of Internationalisation.  Al-Jazeera Centre for Studies. URL:http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2012/3/28/20123281237336734The%20London%20Conference%20on%20Somalia.pdf

Muuse Yuusuf, (22 March 2012). Somalia: The London Conference on Somalia - Rhetoric and Reality. URL: http://allafrica.com/stories/201203260439.html

John Hirsch, (February 29, 2012). London Conference on Somalia: New Roadmap, Old Concerns. Global observatory.  URL: http://www.theglobalobservatory.org/analysis/228-london-conference-on-somalia-new-roadmap-old-concerns.html

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[1] Mohamed Al-Amin (2012)

[2] Somaliland declared independence after the collapse of Somali state, and it currently not recognized by any  country as an independent state

[3] Communiqué (2012)

[4]23^rd/2/2012. London Conference on Somalia: communiqué ,15

[5] Communiqué called on the mandate of the TFG to end by August, 2012, and creation of TF Charter.

[6] ibid 2

[7] This implies states that are members of the Islamic organization conference or the Arab league.