Understanding post election violence in new democracies; governance, ethnic diversity and patronage politics

Although post election violence has been a common occurrence in most African states, the new wave of PEV especially in Guinea and Nigeria shows change in pattern. These states are the so called new democracies in Africa, states that recently underwent democratic transition (S, Omotola 2010). This wave of violence has threatened stability of these states as people took to the streets to redress the disputed elections through violence. And unfortunately in some instances it took ethnic dimensions when a specific group of people were targeted in the process not only complicating the situation but also raising concerns over ethnic violence. Post election violence in these states is linked to patrimonial nature of most African states, weak institutions and exploitation of ethnicity to invoke political support which has undermined stability and security.  Additionally, different parties and leaders in these states have employed different tactics of election malpractices that involves intimidation, fraud, corruption and even violence in order to win election.

Albert argued that as a concept, electoral violence refers to all forms of organised acts or threats, both psychological, physical and structural aimed at harming or intimidating the stakeholder before or after the elections with the purpose of influencing electoral process (as cited in S Omotola 2010, p.2). Physical harm and intimidation has been noticed in Nigeria, Kenya and Guinea where a section of the society have been blamed for the undesired outcome. Although elections are a democratic process it is fascinating to see it take ethnic dimension when the results are contested, showing that most of these states’ political process are ethnicised laying foundation for discontent and grudges. These grudges and grievances which might be historical in nature are usually exploited by politicians for their own personal interest. According to Paul Collier (2010) violence is effective for both incumbent and the challenger into intimidating soft base voters into not voting thus reducing their opponent’s votes. Additionally, politicians have a higher chance of resorting to violence when they are weak position as they will have less to loose in base support, meaning that they will have a higher chance of getting more votes if they turn violent (Collier 2010: pg 3).

For example in Nigeria where election violence is extensive and resembles terrorism, it is vital to understand that the incumbent People’s Democratic Party (PDP) controls elections nationally, it had no problem attracting supporters during this period of oil boom (Collier, 2010). As it turned out the election was marred with violence with Human Rights Watch reporting that violence erupted after elections with political figures openly recruiting gangs. Just like Collier (2010) predicted, violence originated from the opposition side and not the incumbent, after seeing that they will lose to incumbent violence was unleashed on the members of the public to reduce voter turnout and support. This political violence was comparable to terrorism (Collier, 2010: pg, 31).

Briefly going back to 2007 elections in Nigeria which featured contest for federal presidency, legislative assemblies at state and national levels was monumental in that it was for the first time since independence a third round of elections would be under civilian rule and not military. This election was expected to strengthen Nigeria’s new democracy however; it was marred with allegations of vote buying and election intimidation. According to M, Bratton, (2008) vote buying and voter intimidation is one of the major characteristics of Nigerian politics. He also claims that voter intimidations are mostly directed at the poor who reside in rural areas aimed at reducing their turnout while vote buying is used to enhance party loyalty. Voters are offered money, food, clothing or jobs so that they can offer support for a candidate. Bratton (2008), payments made to buy voters loyalty increased between 2003 and 2007 from 1750 Naira to 2250 because proportion of money paid on average increased. It is important to also note that voter intimidation and violence in Nigeria is not affecting everyone, it is concentrated in certain “hot spots” like the Niger Delta region, where electoral violence is three times more than the national average (Bratton: 2008, pg,13). Niger Delta is highly rich in hydrocarbons that drive Nigeria’s economy yet impoverished as political power and wealth are concentrated in the hands of few elites. According to Freedom House (2012) it was estimated that Nigeria lost an estimated $400 billion most of it from oil revenue since independence. And as a strategic place rich in oil Niger Delta experiences recurrent election violence as different factions wants to control it, it is a source of power in itself.

Guinea’s Electoral Commission has been accused of election fraud that led to sentencing of the head of the commission Sekou Sylla (AFP: September/10^th/2010). Unlike Nigeria where electoral violence takes on terrorists’ approach of fear, intimidation and large scale attacks like bombings, the one in Guinea is massive fraud in the process itself that eventually sparked violence in the Capital Conakry. The election was both contested by Diallo and Conde accusing the commission of fraud. According to (D, Paget: 06/01/2011) election fraud in Guinea was so widespread that a second round of free and fair election was quite hard to undertake because of extensive logistical problems that might have made fraud easy as well. After four month delay in the second round of the election the runoff that was conducted changed as Cellou Diallo who was leading previously with large margin was overtaken by Alpha Conde who secured 52.52% of the votes against his’ 47.80%. This news was received with shock the Diallo and his Union of Democratic Forces in Guinea (UDFG), (West Africa Insight 2010: pg1). This shift in the leader from the one who barely had 20% of the votes to now having over 50% according to West Africa Insight can be explained by realignment of forces along ethnic lines. By joing forces and mobilising along ethnic lines Conde and his team were able to gain more support which they couldn’t previously. The unprecedented win of Conde saw tensions amongst Peulh and Malinke extend as far as Sierra Leone. This ethnic cleavage that was widened after election does not only have national implication but also regional one as these ethnicities are found in the neighbouring states which are not that stable either.

According to James D. Long 2012: pg 2), prior to ethnic voting there are four channels through which ethnicity could motivate one to vote for their co-ethnic and this include “effective ties to group membership, fear of or prejudice towards outsiders and expectations of distribution of patronage goods” Strong attachments and feelings in a group can produce strong psychological feelings of affection towards group members. And ethnic ties have the ability to produce strong psychological feelings towards group members, which may make members of the group to privilege their own members. Humans are predisposed to divide themselves into group (Tajfel 1970, 1974, as cited in J, D, Long 2012). This strong connection to groups makes others outside the group being discriminated against however, discrimination does not simply occur because of similarities between member groups but because of loyalty and strong ties that exists between them. Additionally, Horowitz (1985) argues that group allegiance and comparisons are fundamental part of social life (pg 143) these attachments to group can fuel animosity, fear and resentment as much as it positively brings people together. With the existence of divisions amongst different groups of people, cooperation among them seems difficult if not impossible (J, D, Long 2012). Members of minority group are seen as most defensive as they are worried about survival where the other group dominates, and this competition, fear and worry has in turn produced ethnic parties that claim to represent their people’s voices. Additionally, groups defined along ethnic, religious or class boundaries tend to have homogenous preference when it comes to policies which their group prefer but exclude others (J, D, Long 2012).

Chandra (2004), in her model explaining the success of ethnic parties argues that people are instrumentally rational and will vote for a party that will maximise their interest, and this interest might not necessarily express ethnicity. However, she further highlights that elites’ desire for political office as a form of material advancement makes them closer to their political patron and voters in this “patronage democracies” are willing to support parties that will have a higher chance of putting their elites in power. Basing it on this argument, Kenya is a multiparty state where the outcome of the elections can be easily determined based on parties competitive advantages in attracting elites of other ethnic groups to form coalitions, just like in 2002, when NARC presidential candidate won. However, in 2007, with the spilt of NARC into two opposing parties, the country was engulfed in violence with the supporters of ODM’s Raila Odinga claiming they have been robbed of the victory. According to data collected by Gallop (2008), 84% of Kalenjins, 94% of Luos and 78% of Luhyas who were interviewed believed that ODM’s Raila to be legitimate winner while 72% of Kikuyus sided with Kibaki. It can be argued that Luhyas, Luos and Kalenjins voted heavily for ODM because their political elites were heads of the party and that their co-ethnics will be well represented if the party wins. Chandra (2004) further highlights that voters in patronage democracy do not vote on ideologies or policies but rather conduct head counts across party personnel to vote for the party that has majority representation of their ethnic groups.

In Guinea, ethnicity has become a lens through which everyday social, political and economic life is viewed, interpreted whether accurately or not (P, Vernon 2011). Thus, any political appointment or contract by government is being seen by citizens in terms of beneficiary’s ethnic identity and group affiliation. In a recent incident a National Mediator, whose position is constitutionally mandated publicly stated that the Peuhls should stick to commerce as a way of life and stay out of politics which are dominated by Malinke group.

In theory power in any state resides with the people, and the elected are chosen to represent the interest of the people. However, occasionally people’s  will, desire and choice as averted as fraud, intimidation and violence are used by the ones in power or opposition to change election outcomes, and nowhere is this tactics more pronounced than in Nigeria. There are many factors apart from ethno-religious differences that allowed for this to happen in Africa’s largest oil producer. One of this is the nature of Nigerian state. Nigeria underwent decades of military rule before the civilian rule begun in 1999, this rule resulted to competition that saw use of fraudulent tactics in order to win an election like suppression of oppositions groups in the country. States power was used in this attacks leading to emergence of groups that went beyond clash of interests to full scale violence (Haruna & Jumba 2011). Additionally illiteracy and low levels of educations in population have given opportunities to politicians to use these groups of people in the society to cause chaos. Poverty as a result of high unemployment rate in the country of 200 million people has created desperations especially among the youth who lack stable source of income. This according to Harun & Jumba (2011) has led many young men to join group militias in order to feel useful and fulfil some of their societal expectations and obligations. And finally, weak institutions are a foundation for instability in Nigeria, just like it is for Kenya and Guinea. The electoral commission, police, judiciary in the country has been accused of abuses of office and favouring of groups in power like the incumbency and elites. With one of the highest rates of corruption in the World, fraud is a major problem in the country where political patronage is a major characteristic of politics.

Conclusion

Eruption of violence after a contested election does not necessarily reflect rejection of the outcome as announced by the electoral commissions of Kenya, Nigeria and Guinea. However, deep seated grievances towards the incumbent government, weak institutions, fraud allegations, greed and ethicised politics are the driver of violence. Furthermore, ethnic based voting pattern where voters vote for their co-ethnics or leaders supported by elites in their ethnic groups which characterises voting pattern in this states is not necessarily bad either. However, the research found that historical grievances tied to land, economics, discriminations and exclusion coupled with bad governance and weak political institutions that bred patronage has led to strengthening of ethnic grouping. People needed to feel secure, have good access to services and absence of working institution to provide this left a gap that was filled by ethnic grouping. And thus in states like Guinea where nationalism toppled French rule and division among ethnic groups based on language was limited during independence fell back into ethnic division thanks to patronage politics and bad governance.

Additionally, existence of different ethnic groups does not necessarily lead to tension but, discrimination and exclusion especially by the ruling elites and use of ethnic card during elections to mobilise people deepens these cleavages leading to fear of the “other”. And by tying a political position and power to group elevation in governance, states like Kenya and Nigeria has seen emergence of the term “our son, the big man” and in case of Guinea “Malinke votes, Malinke rule”. This shows that the common citizens see the country not ruled by a leader of a civic nation but a rule by an ethnic group.

As long as institutions in these states are not strengthened enough to stand on its own rather than being tied to personalities, these unfortunate incidences of violence and election fraud propagated by both incumbent and opposition parties will continue. Greed for power and the goodies that come with it has entrenched these malpractices in these states and others on the African Continent.

 Ethnic diversity has the ability to strengthen democracy and good governance by providing an alternative outlook, checks and balances in politics as well as establishing a strong opposition based on values and sound policies. However as long as there is exclusion in terms of governance, distribution of wealth, discrimination and intimidation in the society based on ethno-linguistic differences, these states have a slim chance of having a stable, free and fair elections that will help in smooth transition. 

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